IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA

NEIL J. GILLESPIE,
NEIL J. GILLESPIE FOR PRESIDENT,

Petitioners,

v.

PETITION NO. _____
in forma pauperis

SECRETARY OF STATE KEN DETZNER,
Florida's Chief Election Officer,

Respondent.
_____ /

SEPARATE APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS #1

Exhibit 1	Federal Election Commission (FEC) Candidate ID: P60022993
Exhibit 2	Federal Election Commission (FEC) Committee ID: C00627810
Exhibit 3	The Democrats Official Certification of Nomination for Florida
Exhibit 4	Email of Arkansas Deputy Clerk Rose Allen, re attorney Mrs. Clinton
Exhibit 5	Arkansas directory for Mrs. Clinton "suspended for CLE" 3/14/2002
Exhibit 6	Email of Carol Hampton, Arkansas Supreme Court Library re Clinton
Exhibit 7	Email of Debra C. Isley, Virginia State Bar, re Tim Kaine
Exhibit 8	The Republican Party's Certificate of Nomination for Florida
Exhibit 9	Online public Indiana Roll of Attorneys for Mike Pence Oct-31-2016
Exhibit 10	Broad Issue Paper - Separation of Powers - The Florida Bar
Exhibit 11	Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866) Wikipedia
Exhibit 12	Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866) Legal Information Institute

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

FEC FORM 2: STATEMENT OF CANDIDACY

ACCEPTED FEC-1112475 (Supersedes FEC-1098470)

The Candidate ID : P60022993

Thank you. Your filing has been successfully submitted to the FEC.

Click here to view your filing details

Click here to return to Webforms

EXHIBIT 1

Details for Candidate ID : P60022993

Jump To 2016

New Search

Export Options: Metadata XML CSV JSON

CURRENT CANDIDATE INFORMATION P60022993

Name: GILLESPIE, NEIL J. (O - OPEN)
Office Sought: P - PRESIDENT
Election Year: 2016
State: US - UNITED STATES, **District:** 00
Party: UNAFFILIATED

Most Recent Electronic Filings

Document Filed	Amended	Filed On	From Date	End Date	Pages	View / Download
Statement Of Candidacy	AMEND	10/21/2016			2	PDF HTML / FEC-1112475

Listing of Reports and Statements

2016

Document Filed	Amended	Filed On	From Date	End Date	Pages	Page by Page	View / Download
Statement Of Candidacy	New	09/11/2016			2	201609119030767061	PDF HTML / FEC-1098470
RFAI - Informational - Reports		10/13/2016	10/13/2016		2	201610140300063576	PDF

Image# 201610219034504002

FEC FORM 2

STATEMENT OF CANDIDACY

1. (a) Name of Candidate (in full)
Gillespie, Neil, J., ,

(b) Address (number and street) ☐ Check if address changed
8092 SW 115th Loop

2. Candidate's FEC Identification Number
P60022993

(c) City, State, and ZIP Code
Ocala FL 34481

3. Is This Statement ☐ New (N) **OR** ☒ Amended (A)

4. Party Affiliation
UN

5. Office Sought
Presidential

6. State & District of Candidate

DESIGNATION OF PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE

7. I hereby designate the following named political committee as my Principal Campaign Committee for the 2016 (year of election) election(s).

NOTE: This designation should be filed with the appropriate office listed in the instructions.

(a) Name of Committee (in full)
NEIL J. GILLESPIE FOR PRESIDENT

(b) Address (number and street)
8092 SW 115TH LOOP

(c) City, State, and ZIP Code
OCALA FL 34481

DESIGNATION OF OTHER AUTHORIZED COMMITTEES

(Including Joint Fundraising Representatives)

8. I hereby authorize the following named committee, which is NOT my principal campaign committee, to receive and expend funds on behalf of my candidacy.

NOTE: This designation should be filed with the principal campaign committee.

(a) Name of Committee (in full)

(b) Address (number and street)

(c) City, State, and ZIP Code

I certify that I have examined this Statement and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete.

Signature of Candidate
Gillespie, Neil, J., , ***[Electronically Filed]***

Date
10/21/2016

NOTE: Submission of false, erroneous, or incomplete information may subject the person signing this Statement to penalties of 2 U.S.C. §437g.

FEC MISCELLANEOUS TEXT RELATED TO A REPORT, SCHEDULE OR ITEMIZATION

Form/Schedule: **F2A**
Transaction ID :

I am a qualified person with a disability. I request disability accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 12181 et. seq, including the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, as amended, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 701 et. seq, including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended, and Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended. This disability accommodation request also seeks a prohibition against disability discrimination.

Form/Schedule:
Transaction ID:

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

FEC FORM 1: STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION

ACCEPTED FEC-1123118 (Supersedes FEC-1110822)

The Committee ID: C00627810

Thank you. Your filing has been successfully submitted to the FEC.

Click here to view your filing details

Click here to return to Webforms

EXHIBIT 2

Details for Committee ID : C00627810

Export Options: Metadata XML CSV JSON

CURRENT COMMITTEE INFORMATION	C00627810

Name: NEIL J. GILLESPIE FOR PRESIDENT

Address: 8092 SW 115TH LOOP, OCALA, FL 34481

Treasurer Name: GILLESPIE, NEIL J.

Type: P - PRESIDENTIAL

Designation: P - PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE OF A CANDIDATE

Party: UNAFFILIATED

CANDIDATE INFORMATION	
GILLESPIE, NEIL J.	ID: P60022993

Office: P - Presidential

State: US, **District:** 00

Most Recent Electronic Filings

Document Filed	Amended	Filed On	From Date	End Date	Pages	View / Download
Statement Of Organization	AMEND	11/03/2016			5	PDF HTML / FEC-1123118

Listing of Reports and Statements

2016

Document Filed	Amended	Filed On	From Date	End Date	Pages	Page by Page	View / Download
Statement Of Organization	New	10/20/2016			5	201610209033076305	PDF HTML / FEC-1110822

FEC FORM 1

STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION

Office Use Only

1. NAME OF COMMITTEE (in full) ☐ (Check if name is changed) Example: If typing, type over the lines. 12FE4M5

Neil J. Gillespie for President

ADDRESS (number and street) 8092 SW 115th Loop

☐ ◄ (Check if address is changed)

Ocala (CITY ▲) FL (STATE ▲) 34481 – (ZIP CODE ▲)

COMMITTEE'S E-MAIL ADDRESS

☐ ◄ (Check if address is changed) neilgillespie@mfi.net

Optional Second E-Mail Address
neil.gillespie.wh88@wharton.upenn.edu

COMMITTEE'S WEB PAGE ADDRESS (URL)

☒ ◄ (Check if address is changed) http://www.nosue.org/neil-j-gillespie-for-president/

2. DATE M M 10 / D D 19 / Y Y Y Y 2016

3. FEC IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ▶ C C00627810

4. IS THIS STATEMENT ☐ NEW (N) **OR** ☒ AMENDED (A)

I certify that I have examined this Statement and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete.

Type or Print Name of Treasurer Gillespie, Neil, J., ,

Signature of Treasurer *Gillespie, Neil, J., ,* ***[Electronically Filed]*** Date M M 11 / D D 03 / Y Y Y Y 2016

NOTE: Submission of false, erroneous, or incomplete information may subject the person signing this Statement to the penalties of 2 U.S.C. §437g.
ANY CHANGE IN INFORMATION SHOULD BE REPORTED WITHIN 10 DAYS.

Office Use Only				

For further information contact:
Federal Election Commission
Toll Free 800-424-9530
Local 202-694-1100

5. TYPE OF COMMITTEE

Candidate Committee:

(a) [X] This committee is a principal campaign committee. (Complete the candidate information below.)

(b) [ ] This committee is an authorized committee, and is NOT a principal campaign committee. (Complete the candidate information below.)

Name of Candidate: Gillespie, Neil, J., ,

Candidate Party Affiliation: UN

Office Sought: [ ] House [ ] Senate [X] President

State:

District:

(c) [ ] This committee supports/opposes only one candidate, and is NOT an authorized committee.

Name of Candidate:

Party Committee:

(d) [ ] This committee is a _____ (National, State or subordinate) committee of the _____ (Democratic, Republican, etc.) Party.

Political Action Committee (PAC):

(e) [ ] This committee is a separate segregated fund. (Identify connected organization on line 6.) Its connected organization is a:

[ ] Corporation [ ] Corporation w/o Capital Stock [ ] Labor Organization

[ ] Membership Organization [ ] Trade Association [ ] Cooperative

[ ] In addition, this committee is a Lobbyist/Registrant PAC.

(f) [ ] This committee supports/opposes more than one Federal candidate, and is NOT a separate segregated fund or party committee. (i.e., nonconnected committee)

[ ] In addition, this committee is a Lobbyist/Registrant PAC.

[ ] In addition, this committee is a Leadership PAC. (Identify sponsor on line 6.)

Joint Fundraising Representative:

(g) [ ] This committee collects contributions, pays fundraising expenses and disburses net proceeds for two or more political committees/organizations, at least one of which is an authorized committee of a federal candidate.

(h) [ ] This committee collects contributions, pays fundraising expenses and disburses net proceeds for two or more political committees/organizations, none of which is an authorized committee of a federal candidate.

Committees Participating in Joint Fundraiser

1. _____ FEC ID number C

2. _____ FEC ID number C

3. _____ FEC ID number C

4. _____ FEC ID number C

Write or Type Committee Name

Neil J. Gillespie for President

6. Name of Any Connected Organization, Affiliated Committee, Joint Fundraising Representative, or Leadership PAC Sponsor

NONE

Mailing Address

CITY STATE ZIP CODE

Relationship: ☐ Connected Organization ☐ Affiliated Committee ☐ Joint Fundraising Representative ☐ Leadership PAC Sponsor

7. **Custodian of Records:** Identify by name, address (phone number -- optional) and position of the person in possession of committee books and records.

Full Name: Gillespie, Neil, J., ,

Mailing Address: 8092 SW 115th Loop

Ocala FL 34481

CITY STATE ZIP CODE

Title or Position

Telephone number

8. **Treasurer:** List the name and address (phone number -- optional) of the treasurer of the committee; and the name and address of any designated agent (e.g., assistant treasurer).

Full Name of Treasurer: Gillespie, Neil, J., ,

Mailing Address: 8092 SW 115th Loop

Ocala FL 34481

CITY STATE ZIP CODE

Title or Position

Telephone number

Full Name of Designated Agent: Gillespie, Neil, J., ,

Mailing Address: 8092 SW 115th Loop

Ocala | FL | 34481 –

CITY | STATE | ZIP CODE

Title or Position

Telephone number – –

9. **Banks or Other Depositories:** List all banks or other depositories in which the committee deposits funds, holds accounts, rents safety deposit boxes or maintains funds.

Name of Bank, Depository, etc.

Neil J. Gillespie

Mailing Address: 8092 SW 115th Loop

Ocala | FL | 34481 –

CITY | STATE | ZIP CODE

Name of Bank, Depository, etc.

Mailing Address

–

CITY | STATE | ZIP CODE

FEC MISCELLANEOUS TEXT RELATED TO A REPORT, SCHEDULE OR ITEMIZATION

Form/Schedule: **F1A**
Transaction ID :

I am a qualified person with a disability. I request disability accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 12181 et. seq, including the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, as amended, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 701 et. seq, including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended, and Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended. This disability accommodation request also seeks a prohibition against disability discrimination.

Form/Schedule:
Transaction ID:

DEMOCRATS

OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION OF NOMINATION

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that at the National Convention of the Democratic Party of the United States of America, held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on July 25 through 29, 2016, the following were duly nominated as candidates of said Party for President and Vice President of the United States respectively, and that the following are legally qualified to serve as President and Vice President of the United States respectively under the applicable provisions of the United States Constitution:

For President of the United States
Hillary Rodham Clinton
15 Old House Lane
Chappaqua, NY 10514

For Vice President of the United States
Timothy Michael Kaine
1515 Confederate Ave
Richmond, VA 23227

Representative Marcia Fudge
Chair, Democratic National Convention

Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake
Secretary, Democratic National Convention

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Signed and sworn before me this day by MARCIA FUDGE and STEPHANIE RAWLINGS-BLAKE.

Date: July 29, 2016

ANDRE A PHILEMON
Notary Public
State of MARYLAND
Prince George's County
My Commission Expires
June 14th, 2017

Notary Public
My commission expires: _____

EXHIBIT
3

August 3, 2016

Maria Matthews, Division Director
Florida Department of State, Division of Elections
Director's Office
Room 316, R.A. Gray Building
500 South Bronough Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399

Dear Ms. Matthews:

Please find enclosed the official Certificate of Nomination of President Hillary Clinton as the nominee of the Democratic Party of the United States for President of the United States and of Tim Kaine as nominee for Vice President of the United States.

If you need any additional information, please contact me at (985) 519-2390 or dhuynh@hillaryclinton.com. Please confirm as soon as possible via email that you have now received all of the necessary documentation to place Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine on your state's general election ballot for November 8, 2016.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

David Huynh
Director of Delegate Operations and Ballot Access

Enclosure: Official Certification of Nomination

Neil Gillespie

From: "Rose M. Allen" <Rose.Allen@arcourts.gov>
To: "'Neil Gillespie'" <neilgillespie@mfi.net>
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2016 10:01 AM
Subject: RE: public information request

You will need to contact the Office of Professional Programs regarding CLE's that is handled by their office but yes. Their phone number is 501-374-1855.

Rose

From: Neil Gillespie [mailto:neilgillespie@mfi.net]
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2016 9:00 AM
To: Rose M. Allen <Rose.Allen@arcourts.gov>
Subject: Re: public information request

Thank you, but I understand Mrs. Clinton was Suspended for CLE on 3/14/2002. Is that correct? How, then, can she be in good standing with the court? Please see attached, Attorney Directory - Arkansas - HRC Suspended for CLE

> ----- Original Message -----
> **From:** Rose M. Allen
> **To:** 'Neil Gillespie'
> **Sent:** Tuesday, November 01, 2016 9:12 AM
> **Subject:** RE: public information request
>
> Mrs. Clinton bar number is 73104 admitted on 10/18/1973. She is licensed and in good standing with the court and there are no disciplinary actions against her in the State of Arkansas.
>
> Rose Allen
>
> ---
>
> **From:** Neil Gillespie [mailto:neilgillespie@mfi.net]
> **Sent:** Monday, October 31, 2016 9:42 PM
> **To:** Rose M. Allen <Rose.Allen@arcourts.gov>
> **Subject:** public information request
>
> Rose Allen, Deputy Clerk
> Clerk of the Courts Office
> Justice Building
> 625 Marshall Street
> Little Rock, AR 72201
> Phone: 501-682-4369

EXHIBIT
4

Email: rose.allen@arcourts.gov

Good morning. This is a public information request for the Arkansas State Bar attorney license information for Hillary D. Rodham Clinton, such as her bar number, current membership status, date of admission, discipline history, etc. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net

ARKANSAS JUDICIARY

The information provided on this website is not the official record maintained by the Clerk of the Court. To learn the status of an attorney's license, you may call the Clerk's Office at (501) 682-6849.

Return to Attorney Search

Full Name	Full Address	Admission Date
Hillary D. Rodham Clinton	P.O. Box 937 Chappaqua, NY 10514	10/18/1973

Date of Action	Type of Action	Action	Rule	Rule Number	Stay Date	Reinstated Date	Case Number	Disciplinary Decision	Complainant	Note
3/14/2002	Suspended for CLE	CLE								

EXHIBIT 5

Arkansas Justice Building
625 Marshall Street
Little Rock, AR 72201
(501) 682-6849 (Clerk) | (501) 682-2147 (Library)

Neil Gillespie

From: "Carol Hampton" <Carol.Hampton@arcourts.gov>
To: <neilgillespie@mfi.net>
Cc: "Supreme Court Library" <supreme.court.library@arcourts.gov>; "April L. Davis" <April.Davis@arcourts.gov>
Sent: Monday, October 31, 2016 11:21 AM
Subject: Arkansas Judiciary Contact Us Page-Neil Gillespie

Mr. Gillespie

Thank you for your message to the Arkansas Judiciary website, which was automatically forwarded to the Arkansas Supreme Court Library for a response.

You may direct your request for attorney license information regarding Hillary D. Rodham Clinton to Rose Allen, Deputy Clerk, Clerk of the Courts Office:

Rose Allen, Deputy Clerk
Clerk of the Courts Office
Justice Building
625 Marshall Street
Little Rock, AR 72201
Phone: 501-682-4369
Email: rose.allen@arcourts.gov

Also see information below:

ARKANSAS JUDICIARY

The information provided on this website is not the official record maintained by the Clerk of the Court. To learn the status of an attorney's license, you may call the Clerk's Office at (501) 682-6849.
Return to Attorney Search
Loading ---

Full Name	Full Address	Admission Date
Hillary D. Rodham Clinton	P.O. Box 937 Chappaqua, NY 10514	10/18/1973

Loading ---

Date of Action	Type of Action	ActionRule	Rule Number	Stay Date	Reinstated Date	Case Number	Disciplinary Decision	Complainant	Note
3/14/2002	Suspended for CLE	CLE							

Carol R. Hampton
Supreme Court Library
Library Technical Assistant III
625 Marshall Street
Little Rock, AR 72201
Phone: (501) 682-2148

EXHIBIT 6

Email: carol.hampton@arcourts.gov

Disclaimer: Information provided by the Arkansas Supreme Court Library is intended neither to constitute nor replace legal advice provided by competent legal counsel.

This e-mail is intended for receipt only by the individual named herein as addressee, and any interception of this message by another, whether accidental or intentional, is in no manner a waiver of any confidentiality or privilege doctrines. If you believe that you have received this message in error, please notify the sender immediately, and permanently delete this message and all attachments. Anyone other than the intended recipient of this message is forbidden from copying, disseminating, transferring, or in any way reproducing or distributing this message, its contents, or its attachments.
Submitted on Monday, October 31, 2016 - 09:31 Submitted by anonymous user: [170.94.39.206] Submitted values are:

First Name: Neil
Last Name: Gillespie
Organization Name:
Current Mailing Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
County:
Phone:
Email Address: neilgillespie@mfi.net
Comments:
Arkansas Justice Building
Little Rock, AR 72201

Good morning. This is a public information request for the Arkansas State Bar attorney license information for Hillary D. Rodham Clinton, such as her bar number, current membership status, date of admission, discipline history, etc. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net

The results of this submission may be viewed at:
https://courts.arkansas.gov/node/190790/submission/3120

Neil Gillespie

From: "Membership" <membership@vsb.org>
To: "Neil Gillespie" <neilgillespie@mfi.net>
Sent: Monday, October 31, 2016 10:14 AM
Subject: RE: attorney license information for Timothy Michael Kaine

Timothy Michael Kaine

Bar ID #24165

Currently inactive in good standing

Licensed 10/2/1984

No record of public discipline

Debra C. Isley, Administrative Assistant
Virginia State Bar
1111 East Main Street, Suite 700 | Richmond, Virginia 23219-0026
(804) 775-0530
www.vsb.org | isley@vsb.org

Sent: Sunday, October 30, 2016 1:19 PM
To: Membership
Cc: Neil Gillespie
Subject: attorney license information for Timothy Michael Kaine

Virginia State Bar
1111 East Main Street, Suite 700
Richmond, VA 23219-3565
membership@vsb.org

Good Afternoon. This is a public information request for the Virginia State Bar attorney license information for Timothy Michael Kaine, such as his VSB number, current membership status, date of admission, discipline history, etc. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net

EXHIBIT
7

To: **Ken Detzner, Secretary of State**

From: **Blaise Ingoglia, Chairman, Republican Party of Florida**
John Phillippe, Chief Counsel, Republican National Committee

Date: **July 22, 2016**

Re: **Presidential and Vice Presidential Certificate of Nomination**

Attached please find a copy of the Republican Party's Certificate of Nomination, which shall serve as official certification to your office of the 2016 Republican National Convention's nomination for President and Vice President of the United States, respectively.

The attached Certificate of Nomination is signed by Paul Ryan, as Chairman of the 2016 Republican National Convention, and Susie Hudson, as Secretary of the 2016 Republican National Convention.

Please confirm as soon as possible that you have now received all of the necessary documentation to place the party's nominees for President and Vice President on your state's general election ballot for November 8, 2016. This confirmation can be sent by emailing a letter to Christina Schaengold, Associate Counsel, in the Republican National Committee Counsel's Office. Christina can be reached at (202) 863 5107, or by e-mail at cschaengold@gop.com.

Thank you for your assistance with this very important matter. If you have any questions or concerns relating to this certification, please do not hesitate to contact Christina Schaengold, Associate Counsel, in the Republican National Committee Counsel's Office.

EXHIBIT
8

CERTIFICATE OF NOMINATIONS

State of Florida:

We do hereby certify that at a National Convention of Delegates representing the Republican Party of the United States, duly held and convened in the City of Cleveland, State of Ohio, on July 20, 2016, the following person, meeting the constitutional requirements for the Office of President of the United States, and the following person, meeting the constitutional requirements for the Office of Vice President of the United States, were nominated for such offices to be filled at the ensuing general election, November 8, 2016, viz.:

TITLE OF OFFICE TO BE FILLED	NAME OF CANDIDATE	NAME OF PARTY	PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF CANDIDATE
President of the United States	Donald J. Trump	Republican	721 Fifth Avenue PH New York, NY 10022
Vice President of the United States	Michael R. Pence	Republican	4750 North Meridian Street Indianapolis, IN 46208

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hand this 20th day of July, 2016

Permanent Address of Chairman of Convention: PAUL RYAN, 700 SAINT LAWRENCE AVENUE, JANESVILLE, WISCONSIN 53545

Chairman of the 2016 Republican National Convention

Permanent Address of Secretary of Convention: SUSIE HUDSON, 1658 ROUTE 12, WEST BERLIN, VT 05663

Secretary of the 2016 Republican National Convention

Paul Ryan, being duly sworn, says that he was the presiding officer of the Convention of Delegates mentioned and described in the foregoing certificate, and that the said Susie Hudson was the secretary of such convention, and that said certificate and the statements therein contained are true to the best of his information and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of July, 2016

Notary Public

My Commission expires on the 10 day of July 2021

GINEEN MARIA BRESSO
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE OF OHIO
Recorded in Cuyahoga County
My commission expires July 10, 2021

Susie Hudson, being duly sworn, says that she was the secretary of the Convention of Delegates mentioned and described in the foregoing certificate, and that the said Paul Ryan was the presiding officer of such convention, and that said certificate and the statements therein contained are true to the best of her information and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of July, 2016

Notary Public

My Commission expires on the 10th day of July 2021

GINEEN MARIA BRESSO
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE OF OHIO
Recorded in Cuyahoga County
My commission expires July 10, 2021

courts.IN.gov

Indiana Roll of Attorneys

Attorney Record

Search Results | New Search

Mr. Michael Richard Pence

Attorney Number: 10892-49

Contact Information

Firm Name:
Address 1: 200 W. Washington Street
Address 2:
Address 3:
City: Indianapolis
State: IN
Zip: 46204
Phone: 317-695-5453
E-mail:

Status Information

License Status	**Inactive In Good Standing**
Status Date	**03-05-2012**
Admit Date	**05-30-1986**

Disciplinary Information

This attorney has no disciplinary history

Disciplinary information listed here includes the most recent pending case and/or the most recent concluded case as of July 1, 2011 as well as any subsequent cases filed since that date. If an attorney has any disciplinary history, at least one case will be listed above, but this list does not necessarily represent a complete disciplinary history.

About Disciplinary Information

Concluded Discipline

Without further information, you should not draw any conclusions about past discipline. Some cases end with minor discipline or are dismissed with no discipline.

Pending Discipline

The fact that there is an ongoing case means that it is alleged that the lawyer committed misconduct, but there has been no decision finding those allegations to be true.

More Information

To get more information about a lawyer's pending disciplinary cases, contact:

Roll of Attorneys Administrator
(317) 232-5861
rollatty@courts.IN.gov

To get more information about a lawyer's concluded disciplinary cases, contact:

Records Administrator
(317) 232-7225
recordsadmin@courts.IN.gov

Copies of filings are $1.00/page

EXHIBIT 9

The Florida Bar
www.floridabar.org

Bar Issue Papers

Separation of Powers

On This Page

EXHIBIT 10

I. Issue

Independence of the judiciary (the third branch of government, coequal to the executive and legislative branches) has been a cherished hallmark of our democratic republic. The judiciary balances and, where necessary, checks the power of the other branches. Judges, in order to render decisions based on law and not people, must be protected from the influences of partisan politics. However, less clear is the protection stemming from separation of powers extended to "officers of the court'' -- lawyers. From time to time in Florida, the suggestion is made to place disciplinary regulation of lawyers under the executive branch or to subject the practice of law to legislative control, such as limiting fees or disclosing information that could fall under attorneyclient privilege.

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II. Bar Position

The Florida Bar has long maintained that this state's separation of powers doctrine precludes legislative entry into the regulation of lawyers. Regulation of the legal profession is a unique and proper power of the courts in the exclusive exercise of the court's judicial function -- certainly as long as Article V. Section 15 of the Florida Constitution remains intact. The Bar's formal legislative position on this issue has typically been expressed as opposition to "amendments to the Florida Constitution which would alter the authority of the Supreme Court of Florida to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law or the discipline of persons admitted."

Back to Top

III. Background

A. United States -- Separation of Powers

The U. S. Constitution defines the power of the three main branches of the federal government as legislative, executive and judicial.

The U.S. Constitution provides the framework for the exercise of power by the federal government. Although the document contains no express separation of powers provision, the constitution defines and allocates the power of the federal government among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The framers of the constitution divided the exercise of governmental power into three branches to prevent that power from concentrating in one body. Checks to balance the power of the other branches are expressly provided in the constitution creating an overlap of power among the branches. In this way, the power of each branch is limited by giving to an equal branch one facet of another's unique power. Using these checks, the three branches compete among themselves to keep a relative balance of power. Therefore, each branch's exercise of its type of power is not absolute. Under a literal interpretation of the structure created in the constitution, violation of the separation of powers doctrine occurs whenever the power of one branch is exercised by another branch without express authority in the Constitution.

The separation of the powers of government is a fundamental principle of every free and good government and is historically a part of both the state and federal constitutions. It is fundamental to the very existence and perpetuity of the American form of government and is one of the most important principles guaranteeing the liberty of the people and preventing the exercise of autocratic power.

Back to Top

1. Legislative

U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 1: "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall

consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." Section 8 of that article enumerates those powers which, among others, include: (1) to lay and collect taxes, excises, imports and duties, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare; (2) to regulate commerce; (3) to establish uniform laws of bankruptcy; (4) to coin money and punish counterfeiting; (5) to establish post offices and post roads; (6) to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court; (7) to declare war; (8) to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a Navy; (9) to make rules for the government; and (10) to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the legislative powers and all other powers vested by the constitution by the government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof.

2. Executive

U.S. Constitution Article II, Section 1: "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." Article II, Sections 2 and 3 define those powers: (1) The president shall be commanderinchief of the Army and Navy of the U.S., and of the militia of the states, when called into the actual service of the U.S.; (2) the president shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties; (3) the president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session; and (4) the president shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as the president shall judge necessary and expedient; the president may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses or either of them.

3. Judicial

The U.S. Constitution Article III, Section 1 reads: "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Judicial power shall extend to: all cases, in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; controversies to which the United States shall be a party; controversies between two or more states; cases between a state and citizens of another state; cases between citizens of different states, cases between citizens of the same state claiming lands under the grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. Judicial power also extends to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury. Such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed.

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B. Florida -- Separation of Powers

According to the State of Florida Constitution Article II, Section 3, the powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided.

1. Legislative

Article III Section 1 of the Florida Constitution states that the "legislative power of the state shall be vested in a legislature of the State of Florida, consisting of a senate composed of one senator elected from each senatorial district and a house of representatives composed of one member elected from each representative district." The legislature has been described generally as the lawmaking branch of government. It also has the broad purpose of determining policies and programs and reviewing program performance.

Basically, the legislature is empowered to enact statutes that: levy and collect taxes; oversee professional licensing boards; ensure the public's health, safety and welfare; define crime and provide punishment for violations; build highways; regulate marriage and divorce; authorize establishment of cities. In addition, the legislature may also overturn the governor's veto, determine fiscal policies in the preparation of the General Appropriations Act and conduct formal investigations of alleged misconduct by government agencies and even private businesses.

2. Executive

Article IV, Section 1 states that the supreme executive power shall be vested in a governor who shall: be commanderinchief of all military forces of the state not in active service of the United States. The governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, commission all officers of the state and counties, and transact all necessary business with the officers of government. The governor may require information in writing from all executive or administrative state, county or municipal officers upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices; initiate judicial proceedings in the name of the state against any executive or administrative state, county or municipal officer to enforce compliance with any duty or restrain any unauthorized act; request in writing the opinion of the justices of the Supreme Court of Florida as to the interpretation of any portion of the state constitution upon any question affecting the governor's executive powers and duties; have power to call out the militia to preserve the public peace, execute the laws of the state, suppress insurrection, or repel invasion; and by message, at least once in each regular session, inform the legislature concerning the condition of the state, propose such reorganization of the executive department as will promote efficiency and economy, and recommend measures in the public interest.

Additionally, the governor prepares a recommended balanced budget to be submitted prior to the legislative session. The governor retains line item veto of the General Appropriations Act and has other veto power in order to nullify any legislative act found unacceptable.

3. Judicial

The third branch of state government, the judiciary, exists because of Article V, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution. The judicial department of the government is that branch: intended to interpret, construe, and apply the law; and charged with the declaration of what the law is, and its construction so far as it is written law. Section 1 states that the "judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts of appeal, circuit courts and county courts. No other courts may be established by the state, any political subdivision or any municipality. The legislature shall, by general law, divide the state into appellate court districts an judicial circuits following county lines. Commissions established by law, or administrative officers or bodies may be granted quasijudicial power in matters connected with the functions of their offices. The legislature may establish by general law a civil traffic hearing officer system for the purpose of hearing civil traffic infractions.''

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a) *Supreme Court -- Jurisdiction*

1. Shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted;
2. Shall hear appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty and from decisions of district courts of appeal declaring invalid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution;
3. When provided by general law, shall hear appeals from final judgments entered in proceedings for the validation of bonds or certificates of indebtedness and shall review action of statewide agencies relating to rates or service of utilities providing electric, gas, or telephone service;
4. May review any decision of a district court of appeal that expressly declares valid a state statute, or that expressly construes a provision of the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a class of constitutional or state officers, or that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law;
5. May review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes upon a question certified by it to be of great public importance, or that is certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal;
6. May review any order or judgment of a trial court certified by the district court of appeal in which an appeal is pending to be of great public importance, or to have a great effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the state, and certified to require immediate resolution by the supreme court;
7. May review a question of law certified by the Supreme Court of the United States or a United States Court of Appeals which is determinative of the cause and for which there is no controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of Florida;
8. May issue writs of prohibition to courts and all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction;
9. May issue writs of mandamus and quo warranto to state officers and state agencies;
10. May, or any justice may, issue writs of habeas corpus returnable before the supreme court or any justice, a district court of appeal or any judge thereof, or any circuit judge;
11. Shall, when requested by the attorney general pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Article IV, render an advisory opinion of the justices, addressing issues as provided by general law.

b) *District Courts of Appeal -- Jurisdiction*

1. District courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or orders of trial courts, including those entered on review of administrative action, not directly appealable to the supreme court or a circuit court. They may review interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by rules adopted by the supreme court;
2. District courts of appeal shall have the power of direct review of administrative action, as prescribed by general law;
3. A district court of appeal or any judge thereof may issue writs of habeas corpus returnable before the court or any judge thereof or before any circuit judge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. A district court of appeal may issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and other writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction. To the extent necessary to dispose of all issues in a cause properly before it, a district court of appeal may exercise any of the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts.

c) Circuit Courts -- Jurisdiction

1) The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction not vested in the county courts, and jurisdiction of appeals when provided by general law. They shall have the power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition and habeas corpus, and all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of their jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the circuit court shall be uniform throughout the state. They shall have the power of direct review of administrative action prescribed by general law.

d) County Courts -- Jurisdiction

1. The county courts shall exercise the jurisdiction prescribed by general law. Such jurisdiction shall be uniform throughout the state.

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4. Judiciary and the Regulation of Attorneys

As previously mentioned, according to Florida Constitution Article V, Section 15, Attorneys; admission and discipline, "the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.''

The distinguishing feature of the legal profession is that lawyers, in a real sense, are members of the judicial branch of government. They are truly "officers of the court." Their duties go far beyond representing a client's best interest and merely practicing law competently. They have duties to the system of justice itself. The Florida Constitution has specified for lawyers a special role in the state's judicial system. The system simply would not function without lawyers.

The practice of law differs from other professions because of its unique relationship to the judicial branch of government. Regulation of the bar and the practice of law is totally unlike regulation of professions for the reason that the functions of the courts are inextricably intertwined with the practice of law. The conduct of lawyers is, therefore, subject to special and stringent regulatory supervision because the functions performed by lawyers constitute an integral element of the judicial process. As expressed by the Florida Supreme Court when it unified the Florida State Bar: "It is hardly necessary to assert that the bar has responsibility to the public that is unique and different in degree from that exacted from the members of other professions." *Petition of Florida State Bar Association*, 40 So. 2d 902, 908 (Fla. 1949).

The Court further emphasizes these precepts in the preamble to Chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, which contains the rules of professional conduct for attorneys: "An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on the executive and legislative branches of government for the right to practice. Supervision by an independent judiciary, and conformity with the rules the judiciary adopts for the profession, assures both independence and responsibility."

Currently changes in Chapter 3 and 4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar are pending at the Florida Supreme Court.

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a) *Constitutional History*

1868 -- On February 25, 1868, a constitutional convention adopted a revised constitution which included: "Sec. 21. Attorneys at law, who have been admitted to practice in any court of record in any State of the Union or to any United States Court, shall be admitted to practice in any court of this State, on producing evidence of having been so admitted." Art. VI, section 21, Fla. Const. (1868).
1885 -- Art. VI, sec. 21, Fla. Const. (1868), repealed.
1956 -- House Joint Resolution 810 approved by the general populace, Art. V, sec. 23, Fla. Const. (1956).

"Section 23. Admission and discipline of attorneys. -- The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted. It may provide for an agency to handle admissions subject to its supervision. It may also provide for the handling of disciplinary matters in the circuit courts and the district courts of appeal, or by commissions consisting of members of the bar to be designated by it, the supreme court, subject to its supervision and review.''
1972 -- Senate Joint Resolution 520 approved November 1972 by the general populace (from the 1968 constitutional revision) renumbering and amending Art. V, sec. 23, Fla. Const. (1957) to Art. V, sec. 15, Fla. Const. (1972).

"Section 15. Attorneys; admission and discipline. -- The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.''

During the period from 1830 to 1870, there was a movement which wasn't called deregulation. It was called deprofessionalism of the bar. As a result of that, anybody could be a judge or a lawyer without any kind of certification or training. The results were chaotic; the public was misled, defrauded, administration of justice deteriorated and great public mischief resulted. For a period of 120 years, prior to 1949, the legal profession of Florida was subject to the jurisdiction of the legislature. During that period, there were less than 30 reported cases of discipline in the State of Florida . . . and there were even fewer reports of any kind of punishment.

Over the years, several challenges to this constitutional section (Article V, Section 15) have occurred. Some were court cases, some were initiatives by special interest groups to amend the constitution and others were legislatively sponsored.

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b) *Legislative Activity*

Probably the most substantial challenge to the Supreme Court's regulation of the legal profession was the 1979 Legislative Subcommittee on the Legal Profession (Sheldon Committee) which studied the possible sunset of The Florida Bar's regulatory function. The Bar was obligated to prove its indispensability in the regulation of the legal profession. The conclusions and recommendations of the Sheldon Committee were published on June 5, 1980. The Committee at that time decided not to propose legislation or a constitutional amendment to alter control of the legal profession but instead recommended administrative changes including adding public members to the Bar's Board of Governors, removing the confidentiality in attorney discipline cases after probable cause has been ascertained, not using Bar dues for lobbying efforts without contributors' approval, and periodic sunsettype review by the Legislature.

One of the seminal arguments by the Bar to leave regulation of lawyers with the Supreme Court was the separation of powers doctrine which precludes legislative entry into this area. The Bar observed that regulation of the legal profession is a unique and proper power of the court in the exclusive exercise of the court's judicial function. The Sheldon Committee's response to the separation of powers argument was that the court, by compelling and spending Bar dues, may be using an exclusively "legislative" power. (Article V, S. 14 which states that the judiciary shall have no power to fix appropriations.) The Committee further noted that dues collected and spent by agencies of the court, in

effect, "arms of the court," are public monies because the court, through its agencies, uses state power to raise that money. The Committee suggested that it is the exclusive inherent power of the Legislature, not the courts, to raise and regulate the spending of public money.

Throughout the existence of The Florida Bar there have been periodic efforts to introduce legislation that would pave the way for a popular vote on a constitutional amendment to alter the Supreme Court's authority to regulate and discipline attorneys. None of those measures has ever gained significant legislative momentum. And, the Bar has consistently opposed such proposals in its formal legislative advocacy.

During the 1990 Legislative Session, HB 2625 was introduced which would create an Attorney Discipline Study Committee composed of five members, including three nonlawyers. The panel would investigate, monitor and evaluate complaints about attorney unresponsiveness, incompetence, fee disputes and unethical conduct. A similar bill was introduced in 1989 but did not pass.

During the 1994 regular session, the Florida Legislature considered several measures that would have affected the authority of the Supreme Court of Florida to regulate the admission and discipline of lawyers. One House bill that died in committee would have urged the court to adopt rules amendments to require that bar admissions decisions be made public. Another Senate proposal would have sought a study of the due process aspects of the bar admissions application process -- that measure was withdrawn, and a Supreme Court study committee was named to consider the issue among others.

A special commission to review and make recommendations for change in the judicial article of the Florida Constitution was created during the 1994 regular legislative session: Ch. 94138, Laws of Florida. Although the focus of the Article V Task Force is judicial matters and court structure, the enabling legislation calls for "additional recommendations to improve the administrative of justice."

The Task Force's final report of December 1995 included a unanimous recommendation to maintain Florida's current constitutional process for regulating and disciplining attorneys. "The statistics and testimony overwhelming support the current scheme," the report states, "and no evidence was offered to indicate that any other form of regulation and discipline would produce the same favorable results."

Nevertheless, during the 1996 Legislative Session, matching bills were introduced in the House (HB 1453 Melvin) and Senate (SB 2456 Gutman) to offer voters a proposed constitutional amendment giving the legislature oversight over lawyer admission and regulation. The sponsor of the House legislation withdrew the measure when it became obvious that it would fail in the Judiciary Committee. The Senate companion was never heard.

Also in 1996, the House Appropriations Committee separately considered a claim that the legislature, by virtue of 1992 amendments to Article III, Section 19, has full authority over the finances of the Bar, the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, and the Florida Bar Foundation. The issue died after one morning of committee testimony from Court and Bar officials, and -- aided by a scholarly analysis of the constitutional amendment in question -- when it became clear that the current fiscal processes of these entities had more than enough supporters to thwart further legislative inquiry.

Similar legislation was proposed during the 1997 Legislative Session. The proposal (HB 1817) passed in the House Criminal Justice Appropriations Committee, but died on the House floor.

And, in the 1998 session similar legislation to amend Art V §15 of the state constitution, to allow for legislative control of attorney admission and discipline, was introduced -- but thereafter withdrawn during session.

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c) Relevant Court Cases

1. Financial Disclosure

In re: The Florida Bar, Advisory Opinion Concerning Applicability of Chapter 74177 [Chapter 112.312(2),(1989)], 316 So. 2d 45 (1975). This was an advisory opinion concerning the applicability of Chapter 74177, Laws of Florida -- Financial Disclosure Law -- to members of The Florida Bar acting in their historical professional capacity as "officers of the court." The Supreme Court of Florida found the Financial Disclosure Law inapplicable as a code of conduct to officers of the judicial branch as the Supreme Court has the inherent right to supervise the bar as an incident to the Supreme Court's power to control, admit to practice and discipline attorneys based on Article V, Section 15, Florida Constitution.

2. Public Records

In re: The Florida Bar. In re: Advisory Opinion Concerning the Applicability of Chapter 119, Florida Statutes. 398 So. 2d 446 (1981). This was an advisory opinion concerning the applicability of the Public Records Law to The Florida Bar's unlicensed practice of law investigation files. The Court ruled that the UPL investigation files of The Florida Bar, as an official arm of the Court, were subject to the control and direction of the Supreme Court and not to either of the other branches of the government.

This notion was reiterated in *Locke v. Hawkes*, 595 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1992), which dealt with the applicability of Florida's public records law to certain personal records of state legislators. The *Locke* case, with its reconfirmation of Florida's separation of powers doctrine with respect to public records, became the impetus for an amendment of Article I, Section 24 of the Florida Constitution, adopted by the electorate in November 1992.

That measure established a public right of access to the records of all three state governmental branches, and to certain meetings of

executive and legislative agencies. By virtue of the amendment, the legislature now possesses exclusive authority over all affected records and meetings, further restrained by various conditions on enacting any additional exceptions to such openness.

Meetings of the judicial branch were unaffected by the measure, and it specifically validated all rules of court regarding access to records in effect on the date that the amendment was adopted. Six days prior to voter approval of the amendment, the Supreme Court of Florida promulgated several recordsrelated changes to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and the Rules of Judicial Administration: *In Re Amendments to Fla. Rules*, 608 So.2d 472 (Fla. 1992).

Additions to the Rules of Judicial Administration generally confirmed the right of public access to judicial branch records, but established 10 exceptions to such access. The other amendments clarified The Florida Bar's general records policy, and included specific provisions regarding professional ethics opinions, Clients' Security Fund claims, unlicensed practice of law matters, and the review of lawyer advertisements and solicitations.

In 1994 the Supreme Court's Study Committee on Confidentiality of Records of the Judicial Branch presented the court with additional amendments and commentary to Rule of Judicial Administration regarding public access to judicial records. The court's ultimate adoption of those revisions included, on its own motion, a preliminary policy statement concerning the use and maintenance of electronic mail transmissions which the court acknowledged as "judicial records" under the rule. *In Re Amendments to Rule of Judicial Administration 2.051 -- Public Access to Judicial Records*, 651 So.2d 1185 (Fla. 1995).

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3. Unlicensed Practice of Law

In 1956, Florida voters adopted a revised Article V of the state constitution. Section 23 of the new article, now Section 15, gave the Supreme Court of Florida "exclusive jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted." The Florida Supreme Court adopted as its own language from *West Virginia State Bar v. Earley*, 109 S.E. 2d 420 (W.Va. 1959) in the *Sperry* case (cited below) relevant to UPL and licensing: ". . . It would indeed be an anomaly if the power of the courts to protect the public from the improper or unlawful practice of law were limited to licensed attorneys and did not extend or apply to incompetent and unqualified laymen and law agencies. Such a limitation of the power of the courts would reduce the legal profession to an unskilled vocation, destroy the usefulness of licensed attorneys as officers of the courts, and substantially impair and disrupt the orderly and effective administration of justice by the judicial department of the government; and this the law will not recognize or permit."

- *The Florida Bar v. Escobar*, 322 So. 2d 25 (1975) stated that the constitutional provision giving the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law necessarily includes the power to prevent the unlicensed practice of law.
- *The Florida Bar v. Moses*, 380 So. 2d 412 Fla. (1980). Moses represented himself before a hearing officer of the state Division of Administrative Hearings, relying on a Florida statute which stated that a person is entitled to representation by counsel or by "other qualified representatives." Nonlawyers may practice in Florida administrative proceedings if they comply with *Moses* and the applicable Florida administrative rules. This ruling stated that, implicit in the Florida Supreme Court's power to define the practice of law and regulate those who may so practice and prohibit the unlicensed practice of law is the ability to authorize the practice of law by lay representatives.

4. Judicial Discipline:

The Florida Bar v. David Lucas McCain, 330 So. 2d 712 (1976). An attorney, who was formerly a Supreme Court Justice, moved to dismiss and/or quash a report by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar of probable cause for further disciplinary proceedings against him. The Supreme Court held that the Board of Governors, serving as an adjunct or administrative agency of the Supreme Court, had jurisdiction to discipline an attorney for acts bearing on his fitness to practice law even when those acts occurred while the attorney held judicial office.

5. Legal Representation of the Poor

Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar -- 13.1(a) and Rules of Judicial Administration -- 2.065 (Legal Aid), 598 So. 2d 41 (Fla., 1992). Upon consideration of a report from a Joint Commission of Florida Bar and Florida Bar Foundation representatives, the Court approved an annual minimum of 20 hours of voluntary pro bono legal services to the poor, for each Florida Bar member, or an alternative contribution of $350 to a legal services agency. The Court noted: "What makes our legal system so different is the ability of lawyers to challenge the constitutionality of government conduct before a separate, independent judicial branch of government. Although an independent judiciary is essential, an independent legal profession plays a critical role in maintaining our constitutional structure." In support of pro bono, the opinion added: "We find it is important for an independent legal profession to provide a portion of indigent representation to ensure proper challenges against government violations of individual rights." Yet the Court further stressed: "To the legislature, we emphasize that the legal profession is not able to singlehandedly resolve the problem of indigent legal representation, and, although there is a budget crisis, funding will eventually have to be provided to address a significant portion of the needs identified by the Commission and particularly legal representation that is now mandated by the Constitution.''

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Prepared by The Florida Bar Department of Public Information and Bar Services with assistance from the General Counsel and the Unlicensed Practice of Law Department.

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[Revised: 5/26/05]

Ex parte Garland

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/71/333/) (1866), was an important United States Supreme Court case involving the disbarment of former Confederate officials.

Case

In January 1865 the Congress of the United States passed a law that effectively disbarred former members of the Confederate government by requiring a loyalty oath be recited by any Federal court officer affirming that the officer had never served in the Confederate government.

Augustus Hill Garland, an attorney and former Confederate Senator from Arkansas, had previously received a pardon from President Andrew Johnson. Garland came before the court and pleaded that the act of Congress was a bill of attainder and an *ex post facto* law which unfairly punished him for the crime for which he had been pardoned and was therefore unconstitutional.

Decision

In a 5-4 vote the Supreme Court ruled that the law was indeed a bill of attainder and an *ex post facto* law. The court ruled that Garland was beyond the reach of punishment of any kind due to his prior presidential pardon. The court also stated that counselors are officers of the court and not officers of the United States, and that their removal was an exercise of judicial power and not legislative power. The law was struck down, opening the way for former Confederate government officials to return to positions within the federal judiciary.

Ex parte Garland	
Supreme Court of the United States	
Argued December 15, 22, 1865 Reargued March 13–15, 1866 Decided January 14, 1867	
Full case name	*Ex parte Garland*
Citations	71 U.S. 333 (https://supreme.justia.com/us/71/333/case.html) (*more*)
Holding	
Congress cannot punish a person for a crime for which the person has been pardoned.	
Court membership	
Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase	
Associate Justices James M. Wayne · Samuel Nelson Robert C. Grier · Nathan Clifford Noah H. Swayne · Samuel F. Miller David Davis · Stephen J. Field	
Case opinions	
Majority	Field, joined by Wayne, Nelson, Grier, Clifford
Dissent	Miller, joined by Chase, Swayne, Davis

External links

- Works related to *Ex parte Garland* at Wikisource
- Full text of the decision courtesy of Findlaw.com (http://laws.findlaw.com/us/71/333.html)

Categories: 1866 in United States case law | United States Supreme Court cases | United States Constitution Article One case law | United States clemency case law | Reconstruction Era

EXHIBIT 11

United States ex post facto case law | United States Supreme Court cases of the Chase Court

Ex Parte Garland

71 U.S. 333

Ex parte Garland ()

Argued:

Decided:

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- **Syllabus**
- **Opinion**, Field
- **Dissent**, Miller

Syllabus

1. The act of Congress of January 24th, 1865, providing that, after its passage, no person shall be admitted as an attorney and counselor to the bar of the Supreme Court, and, after March 4th, 1865, to the bar of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, or Court of Claims, or be allowed to appear and be heard by virtue of any previous admission, or any special power of attorney, unless he shall have first taken and subscribed to the oath prescribed in the act of July 2d, 1862 -- which latter act requires the affiant to swear or affirm that he has never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since he has been a citizen thereof, that he has voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto, that he has neither sought nor accepted, nor attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States, and that he has not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution within the United States hostile or inimical thereto -- operates as a legislative decree excluding from the practice of the law in the courts of the United States all parties who have offended in any of the particulars enumerated.

2. Exclusion from the practice of the law in the Federal courts, or from any of the ordinary avocations of life for *past conduct* is punishment for such conduct. The exaction of the oath is the mode provided for ascertaining the parties upon whom the act is intended to operate.

3. The act being of this character partakes of the nature of a bills of pains and penalties, and is subject to the constitutional inhibition against the passage of

EXHIBIT 12

bills of attainder, under which general designation bills of pains and penalties are included.

4. In the exclusion which the act adjudges, it imposes a punishment for some of the acts specified which were not punishable at the time they were committed, and for other of the acts, it adds a new punishment to that before prescribed, and it is thus within the inhibition of the Constitution against the passage of an *ex post facto* law.

5. Attorneys and counselors are not officers of the United States; they are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character.

6. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications and are entitled to appear as attorneys and counselors and conduct causes therein. From its entry, the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court *after opportunity to be heard has been afforded.* Their admission and their exclusion are the exercise of judicial power. **[p334]**

7. The right of an attorney and counselor, acquired by his admission, to appear for suitors and to argue causes, is not a mere indulgence -- a matter of grace and favor -- revocable at the pleasure of the court, or at the command of the legislature. It is a right of which he can only be deprived by the judgment of the court, for moral or professional delinquency.

8. The admitted power of Congress to prescribe qualifications for the office of attorney and counselor in the Federal courts cannot be exercised as a means for the infliction of punishment for the past conduct of such officers, against the inhibition of the Constitution.

9. The power of pardon conferred by the Constitution upon the President is unlimited except in cases of impeachment. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. The power is not subject to legislative control.

10. A pardon reaches the punishment prescribed for an offence and the guilt of the offender. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. It gives him a new credit and capacity. There is only this limitation to its operation: it does not restore offices forfeited, or property of interests vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgment.

11. The petitioner in this case, having received a full pardon for all offences committed by his participation, direct or implied, in the Rebellion, is relieved from all penalties and disabilities attached to the offence of treason, committed by such participation. For that offence, he is beyond the reach of punishment of any kind. He cannot, therefore, be excluded by reason of that offence from continuing in the enjoyment of a previously acquired right to appear as an attorney and counselor in the Federal courts.

On the 2d of July, 1862, Congress, by "An act to prescribe an oath of office, and for other purposes," **[n1]** enacted:

That hereafter every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or

profit under the government of the United States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of the public service, excepting the President of the United States, shall, before entering upon the duties of such office, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation:

I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; *that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to* **[p335]** *persons engaged in armed hostility thereto;* that I have neither sought nor accepted, not attempted to exercise the functions of *any office whatever, under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States;* that I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution with the United States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God;

&c.

Any person who shall falsely take the said oath shall be guilty of perjury, and, on conviction, in addition to the penalties now prescribed for that offence, shall be deprived of his office, and rendered incapable forever after of holding any office or place under the United States.

On the 24th of January, 1865, **[n2]** Congress passed a supplementary act extending these provisions so as to embrace attorneys and counselors of the courts of the United States. I t is as follows:

No person, after the date of this act, shall be admitted to the bar of the *Supreme Court of the United States,* or at any time after the fourth of March next, shall be admitted to the bar *of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, or of the Court of Claims,* as an attorney or counselor of such court, or shall be allowed to appear and be heard in any such court, by virtue of any previous admission, or any special power of attorney, unless he shall have first taken and subscribed the oath prescribed in "An act to prescribe an oath of office and for other purposes," approved July 2d, 1862. And any person who shall falsely take the said oath shall be guilty of perjury, and, on conviction,

&c.

By the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court has power to make rules and decide upon the qualifications of attorneys.

At the December Term of 1860, A. H. Garland, Esquire, was admitted as an attorney and counselor of the court, and took and subscribed the oath then required. The second rule, as it then existed, was as follows: **[p336]**

It shall be requisite to the admission of attorneys and counselors to practise in this court that they shall have been such for three years past in the Supreme Courts of the States to which they respectively belong, *and that their private and professional character shall appear to be fair.*

They shall respectively take the following oath or affirmation, viz.:

I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will demean myself as an attorney and counselor of this court, uprightly, and according to

law, and that I will support the Constitution of the United States.

There was then no other qualification for attorneys in this court than such as are named in this rule.

In March, 1865, this rule was changed by the addition of a clause requiring an oath, in conformity with the act of Congress.

At the same term at which he was admitted, Mr. Garland appeared, and presented printed argument in several cases in which he was counsel. His name continued on the roll of attorneys from then to the present time. but the late Rebellion intervened, and all business in which he was concerned at the time of his admission remained undisposed of. In some of the cases alluded to, fees were paid, and in others, they were partially paid. Having taken part in the Rebellion against the United States by being in the Congress of the so-called Confederate States from May, 1861, until the final surrender of the forces of such Confederate States -- first in the lower house and afterwards in the Senate of that body as the representative of the State of Arkansas, of which he was a citizen -- Mr. Garland could not take the oath prescribed by the acts of Congress before mentioned and the rule of the court of March, 1865.

The State, in May, 1861, passed an ordinance of secession, purporting to withdraw herself from the Union, and afterwards, in the same year, by another ordinance, attached herself to the so-called Confederate States.

In July, 1865, Mr. Garland received from the President **[p337]** a pardon, by which the chief magistrate, reciting that Mr. Garland, "by taking part in the late Rebellion against the government, had made himself liable to heavy pains and penalties," &c., did thereby

Grant to the said A. H. Garland a FULL PARDON AND AMNESTY for all offences by him committed, arising from participation, direct or implied, in the said Rebellion, conditioned as follows: this pardon to begin and take effect from the day on which the said A. H. Garland shall take the oath prescribed in the proclamation of the President, dated May 29th, 1865, and to be void and of no effect if the said A. H. Garland shall hereafter at any time acquire any property whatever in slaves, or make use of slave labor, and that he first pay all costs which may have accrued in any proceedings hitherto instituted against his person or property. And upon the further condition that the said A. H. Garland shall notify the Secretary of State in writing that he has received and accepted the foregoing pardon.

The oath required was taken by Mr. Garland and annexed to the pardon. It was to the purport that he would thenceforth

faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States and the union of the States thereunder, and that he would in like manner abide by and faithfully support all laws and proclamations which had been made during the existing Rebellion with reference to the emancipation of slaves.

Mr. Garland now produced this pardon, and, by petition filed in court, asked permission to continue to practise as an attorney and counselor of the court, without taking the oath required by the act of January 24th, 1865, and the rule of the court. He rested his application principally upon two grounds:

1st. That the act of January 24th, 1865, so far as it affected his status in the court, was unconstitutional and void, and,

2d. That, if the act were constitutional, he was released from compliance with

its provisions by the pardon of the President. **[p374]**

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Opinion

FIELD, J., Opinion of the Court

Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.

On the second of July, 1862, Congress passed an act prescribing an oath to be taken by every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government of the United States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of the public service, except the President, before entering upon the duties of his office, and before being entitled to its salary, or other emoluments. On the 24th of January, 1865, Congress, by a supplementary act, extended its provisions so as to embrace attorneys and counselors of the courts of the United States. This latter act provides that, after its passage, no person shall be admitted as an attorney and counselor to the bar of the Supreme Court, and, after the fourth of March, 1865, to the bar of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, or of the Court of Claims, or be allowed to appear and be heard by virtue of any previous admission, or any special power of attorney, **[p375]** unless he shall have first taken and subscribed the oath prescribed by the act of July 2d, 1862. It also provides that the oath shall be preserved among the files of the court, and if any person take it falsely, he shall be guilty of perjury and, upon conviction, shall be subject to the pains and penalties of that offence.

At the December Term, 1860, the petitioner was admitted as an attorney and counselor of this court, and took and subscribed the oath then required. By the second rule, as it then existed, it was only requisite to the admission of attorneys and counselors of this court that they should have been such officers for the three previous years in the highest courts of the States to which they respectively belonged, and that their private and professional character should appear to be fair.

In March, 1865, this rule was changed by the addition of a clause requiring the administration of the oath in conformity with the act of Congress.

In May, 1861, the State of Arkansas, of which the petitioner was a citizen, passed an ordinance of secession which purported to withdraw the State from the Union, and afterwards, in the same year, by another ordinance, attached herself to the so-called Confederate States, and by act of the congress of that confederacy was received as one of its members.

The petitioner followed the State, and was one of her representatives -- first in the lower house and afterwards in the senate of the congress of that confederacy, and was a member of the senate at the time of the surrender of the Confederate forces to the armies of the United States.

In July, 1865, he received from the President of the United States a full pardon for all offences committed by his participation, direct or implied, in the Rebellion. He now produces his pardon, and asks permission to continue to practise as an attorney and counselor of the court without taking the oath required by the act of January 24th, 1865, and the rule of the court, which he is unable to take by reason of the offices he held under the Confederate government. **[p376]** He rests his application principally upon two grounds:

1st. That the act of January 24th, 1865, so far as it affects his status in the court, is unconstitutional and void, and,

2d. That, if the act be constitutional, he is released from compliance with its provisions by the pardon of the President.

The oath prescribed by the act is as follows:

1st. That the deponent has never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since he has been a citizen thereof;

2d. That he has not voluntarily given aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto;

3d. That he has never sought, accepted, or attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatsoever, under any authority, or pretended authority, in hostility to the United States;

4th. That he has not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution, within the United States, hostile or inimical thereto; and,

5th. That he will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and will bear true faith and allegiance to the same.

This last clause is promissory only, and requires no consideration. The questions presented for our determination arise from the other clauses. These all relate to past acts. Some of these acts constituted, when they were committed, offences against the criminal laws of the country; others may or may not have been offences according to the circumstances under which they were committed and the motives of the parties. The first clause covers one form of the crime of treason, and the deponent must declare that he has not been guilty of this crime not only during the war of the Rebellion, but during any period of his life since he has been a citizen. The second clause goes beyond the limits of treason, and embraces not only the giving of aid and encouragement of a treasonable nature to a public enemy, but also the giving of assistance of any kind to persons engaged **[p377]** in armed hostility to the United States. The third clause applies to the seeking, acceptance, or exercise not only of offices created for the purpose of more effectually carrying on hostilities, but also of any of those offices which are required in every community, whether in peace or war, for the administration of justice and the preservation of order. The fourth clause not only includes those who gave a cordial and active support to the hostile government, but also those who yielded a reluctant obedience to the existing order, established without their co-operation.

The statute is directed against parties who have offended in any of the particulars embraced by these clauses. And its object is to exclude them from the profession of the law, or at least from its practice in the courts of the United States. As the oath prescribed cannot be taken by these parties, the act, as against them, operates as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion. And exclusion from any of the professions or any of the ordinary avocations of life for past conduct can be regarded in no other light than as punishment for such conduct. The exaction of the oath is the mode provided for ascertaining the parties upon whom the act is intended to operate, and, instead of lessening, increases its objectionable character. All enactments of this kind partake of the nature of bills of pains and penalties, and are subject to the constitutional

inhibition against the passage of bills of attainder, under which general designation they are included.

In the exclusion which the statute adjudges, it imposes a punishment for some of the acts specified which were not punishable at the time they were committed, and, for other of the acts, it adds a new punishment to that before prescribed, and it is thus brought within the further inhibition of the Constitution against the passage of an *ex post facto* law. In the case of *Cummings against The State of Missouri,* just decided, we have had occasion to consider at length the meaning of a bill of attainder and of an *ex post facto* law in the clause of the Constitution forbidding their passage by the States, and it is unnecessary to repeat here **[p378]** what we there said. A like prohibition is contained in the Constitution against enactments of this kind by Congress, and the argument presented in that case against certain clauses of the constitution of Missouri is equally applicable to the act of Congress under consideration in this case.

The profession of an attorney and counselor is not like an office created by an act of Congress, which depends for its continuance, its powers, and its emoluments upon the will of its creator, and the possession of which may be burdened with any conditions not prohibited by the Constitution. Attorneys and counselors are not officers of the United States; they are not elected or appointed in the manner prescribed by the Constitution for the election and appointment of such officers. They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court, the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the States to which they respectively belong, for three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry, the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. [n3] Their admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of **[p379]** judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the Court of Appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. [n4] "Attorneys and counselors," said that court,

are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature. And hence their appointment may, with propriety, be intrusted to the courts, and the latter in performing this duty may very justly be considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions.

In *Ex parte Secombe,* [n5] a mandamus to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Minnesota to vacate an order removing an attorney and counselor was denied by this court on the ground that the removal was a judicial act. "We are not aware of any case," said the court,

where a mandamus was issued to an inferior tribunal, commanding it to reverse

or annul its decision, where the decision was in its nature a judicial act and within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion.

And, in the same case, the court observed that

it has been well settled by the rules and practice of common law courts that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.

The attorney and counselor, being by the solemn judicial act of the court clothed with his office, does not hold it as a matter of grace and favor. The right which it confers upon him to appear for suitors and to argue causes is something more than a mere indulgence, revocable at the pleasure of the court or at the command of the legislature. It is a right of which he can only be deprived by the judgment of the court for moral or professional delinquency.

The legislature may undoubtedly prescribe qualifications for the office to which he must conform, as it may, where it has exclusive jurisdiction, prescribe qualifications for the pursuit of any of the ordinary avocations of life. The **[p380]** question in the case is not as to the power of Congress to prescribe qualifications, but whether that power has been exercised as a means for the infliction of punishment, against the prohibition of the Constitution. That this result cannot be effected indirectly by a State under the form of creating qualifications we have held in the case of *Cummings v. The State of Missouri,* and the reasoning by which that conclusion was reached applies equally to similar action on the part of Congress.

This view is strengthened by a consideration of the effect of the pardon produced by the petitioner, and the nature of the pardoning power of the President.

The Constitution provides that the President "shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." **[n6]**

The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during their pendency or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions.

Such being the case, the inquiry arises as to the effect and operation of a pardon, and on this point all the authorities concur. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender, and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that, in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes **[p381]** him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.

There is only this limitation to its operation: it does not restore offices forfeited or property or interests vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgment. **[n7]**

The pardon produced by the petitioner is a full pardon "for all offences by him committed, arising from participation, direct or implied, in the Rebellion," and is subject to certain conditions which have been complied with. The effect of this pardon is to relieve the petitioner from all penalties and disabilities attached to the offence of treason, committed by his participation in the Rebellion. So far as that offence is concerned, he is thus placed beyond the reach of punishment of any kind. But to exclude him, by reason of that offence, from continuing in the enjoyment of a previously acquired right is to enforce a punishment for that offence notwithstanding the pardon. If such exclusion can be effected by the exaction of an expurgatory oath covering the offence, the pardon may be avoided, and that accomplished indirectly which cannot be reached by direct legislation. It is not within the constitutional power of Congress thus to inflict punishment beyond the reach of executive clemency. From the petitioner, therefore, the oath required by the act of January 24th, 1865, could not be exacted even if that act were not subject to any other objection than the one thus stated.

It follows, from the views expressed, that the prayer of the petitioner must be granted.

The case of R. H. Marr is similar in its main features to that of the petitioner, and his petition must also be granted.

And the amendment of the second rule of the court, which requires the oath prescribed by the act of January 24th, 1865, to be taken by attorneys and counselors, having been unadvisedly adopted, must be rescinded.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED. **[p382]**

1. 12 Stat. at Large 502.

2. 13 Stat. at Large 424.

3. *Ex parte Heyfron,* 7 Howard, Mississippi 127; *Fletcher v. Daingerfield,* 20 California 430.

4. 22 New York 81.

5. 19 Howard 9.

6. Article II, § 2.

7. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 402; 6 Bacon's Abridgment, tit. Pardon; Hawkins, book 2, c. 37, §§ 34 and 54.

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Dissent

MILLER, J., Dissenting Opinion

Mr. Justice MILLER, on behalf of himself and the CHIEF JUSTICE, and Justices SWAYNE and DAVIS, delivered the following dissenting opinion, which applies also to the opinion delivered in *Cummings v. Missouri.* (*See supra,* p. 316.)

I dissent from the opinions of the court just announced.

It may be hoped that the exceptional circumstances which give present importance to these cases will soon pass away, and that those who make the laws, both state and national, will find in the conduct of the persons affected by the legislation just declared to be void sufficient reason to repeal, or essentially

modify it.

For the speedy return of that better spirit which shall leave us no cause for such laws all good men look with anxiety and with a hope, I trust, not altogether unfounded.

But the question involved, relating, as it does, to the right of the legislatures of the nation and of the state to exclude from offices and places of high public trust, the administration of whose functions are essential to the very existence of the government, those among its own citizens who have been engaged in a recent effort to destroy that government by force can never cease to be one of profound interest.

It is at all times the exercise of an extremely delicate power for this court of declare that the Congress of the nation, or the legislative body of a State, has assumed an authority not belonging to it, and, by violating the Constitution, has rendered void its attempt at legislation. In the case of an act of Congress, which expresses the sense of the members of a coordinate department of the government, as much bound by their oath of office as we are to respect that Constitution, and whose duty it is, as much as it is ours, to be careful that no statute is passed in violation of it, the incompatibility of the act with the Constitution should be so clear as to leave little reason for doubt before we pronounce it to be invalid.

Unable to see this incompatibility either in the act of Congress or in the provision of the constitution of Missouri upon which this court has just passed, but entertaining a **[p383]** strong conviction that both were within the competency of the bodies which enacted them, it seems to me an occasion which demands that my dissent from the judgment of the court, and the reasons for that dissent, should be placed on its records.

In the comments which I have to make upon these cases, I shall speak of principles equally applicable to both, although I shall refer more directly to that which involves the oath required of attorneys by the act of Congress, reserving for the close some remarks more especially applicable to the oath prescribed by the constitution of the State of Missouri.

The Constitution of the United States makes ample provision for the establishment of courts of justice to administer her law and to protect and enforce the rights of her citizens. Article III, section 1 of that instrument, says that

[t]he judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.

Section 8 of article I closes its enumeration of the powers conferred on Congress by the broad declaration that it shall have authority

to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department thereof.

Under these provisions, Congress has ordained and established circuit courts, district courts, and territorial courts, and has, by various statutes, fixed the number of the judges of the Supreme Court. It has limited and defined the jurisdiction of all these, and determined the salaries of the judges who hold them. It has provided for their necessary officers, as marshals, clerks,

prosecuting attorneys, bailiffs, commissioners, and jurors. And, by the act of 1789, commonly called the Judiciary Act, passed by the first Congress assembled under the Constitution, it is, among other things enacted that,

[i]n all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their causes personally, or by the **[p384]** assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as, by the rules of the said courts respectively, shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.

It is believed that no civilized nation of modern times has been without a class of men intimately connected with the courts, and with the administration of justice, called variously attorneys, counselors, solicitors, proctors, and other terms of similar import. The enactment which we have just cited recognizes this body of men, and their utility in the judicial system of the United States, and imposes upon the courts the duty of providing rules by which persons entitled to become members of this class may be permitted to exercise the privilege of managing and conducting causes in these courts. They are as essential to the successful working of the courts as the clerks, sheriffs, and marshals, and perhaps as the judges themselves, since no instance is known of a court of law without a bar.

The right to practise law in the courts as a profession is a privilege granted by the law under such limitations or conditions in each state or government as the lawmaking power may prescribe. It is a privilege, and not an absolute right. The distinction may be illustrated by the difference between the right of a party to a suit in court to defend his own cause and the right of another to appear and defend for him. The one, like the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, is inalienable. The other is the privilege conferred by law on a person who complies with the prescribed conditions.

Every State in the Union, and every civilized government, has laws by which the right to practise in its courts may be granted, and makes that right to depend on the good moral character and professional skill of the party on whom the privilege is conferred. This is not only true in reference to the first grant of license of practise law, but the continuance of the right is made by these laws to depend upon the continued possession of those qualities.

Attorneys are often deprived of this right upon evidence of bad moral character or specific acts of immorality or dishonesty **[p385]** which show that they no longer posses the requisite qualifications.

All this is done by law, either statutory or common, and whether the one or the other, equally the expression of legislative will, for the common law exists in this country only as it is adopted or permitted by the legislatures or by constitutions.

No reason is perceived why this body of men, in their important relations to the courts of the nation, are not subject to the action of Congress to the same extent that they are under legislative control in the States or in any other government, and to the same extent that the judges, clerks, marshals, and other officers of the court are subject to congressional legislation. Having the power to establish the courts, to provide for and regulate the practice in those courts, to create their officers, and prescribe their functions, can it be doubted that Congress has the full right to prescribe terms for the admission, rejection, and expulsion of attorneys, and for requiring of them an oath, to show whether they have the proper qualifications for the discharge of their duties?

The act which has just been declared to be unconstitutional is nothing more than a statute which requires of all lawyers who propose to practise in the

national courts that they shall take the same oath which is exacted of every officer of the government, civil or military. This oath has two aspects, one which looks to the past conduct of the party and one to his future conduct, but both have reference to his disposition to support or to overturn the government in whose functions he proposes to take part. In substance, he is required to swear that he has not been guilty of treason to that government in the past, and that he will bear faithful allegiance to it in the future.

That fidelity to the government under which he lives, a true and loyal attachment to it, and a sincere desire for its preservation are among the most essential qualifications which should be required in a lawyer seems to me to be too clear for argument. The history of the Anglo-Saxon **[p386]** race shows that, for ages past, the members of the legal profession have been powerful for good or evil to the government. They are, by the nature of their duties, the moulders of public sentiment on questions of government, and are every day engaged in aiding in the construction and enforcement of the laws. From among their numbers are necessarily selected the judges who expound the laws and the Constitution. To suffer treasonable sentiments to spread here unchecked is to permit the stream on which the life of the nation depends to be poisoned at its source.

In illustration of this truth, I venture to affirm that if all the members of the legal profession in the States lately in insurrection had possessed the qualification of a loyal and faithful allegiance to the government, we should have been spared the horrors of the Rebellion. If, then, this qualification be so essential in a lawyer, it cannot be denied that the statute under consideration was eminently calculated to secure that result.

The majority of this court, however, do not base their decisions on the mere absence of authority in Congress and in the States to enact the laws which are the subject of consideration, but insist that the Constitution of the United States forbids, in prohibitory terms, the passage of such laws both to the Congress and to the States. The provisions of that instrument relied on the sustain this doctrine are those which forbid Congress and the States, respectively, from passing bills of attainder and *ex post facto* laws. It is said that the act of Congress and the provision of the constitution of the State of Missouri under review are in conflict with both these prohibitions, and are therefore void.

I will examine this proposition in reference to these two clauses of the Constitution in the order in which they occur in that instrument.

1. In regard to bills of attainder, I am not aware of any judicial decision by a court of Federal jurisdiction which undertakes to give a definition of that term. We are therefore compelled to recur to the bills of attainder passed by the English Parliament, that we may learn so much of their **[p387]** peculiar characteristics, as will enable us to arrive at a sound conclusion as to what was intended to be prohibited by the Constitution.

The word attainder is derived, by Sir Thomas Tomlins, in his law dictionary, from the words *attincta* and *attinctura,* and is defined to be

the stain or corruption of the blood of a criminal capitally condemned; the immediate inseparable consequence of the common law on the pronouncing the sentence of death.

The effect of this corruption of the blood was that the party attainted lost all inheritable quality, and could neither receive nor transmit any property or other rights by inheritance.

This attainder or corruption of blood as a consequence of judicial sentence of death continued to be the law of England in all cases of treason to the time that our Constitution was framed, and, for aught that is known to me, is the law of that country on condemnation for treason at this day.

Bills of attainder, therefore, or acts of attainder, as they were called after they were passed into statutes, were laws which declared certain persons attainted, and their blood corrupted so that it had lost all heritable quality. Whether it declared other punishment or not, it was an act of attainder if it declared this. This also seems to have been the main feature at which the authors of the Constitution were directing their prohibition, for, after having, in article I, prohibited the passage of bills of attainder -- in section nine to Congress and in section ten to the States -- there still remained to the judiciary the power of declaring attainders. Therefore, to still further guard against this odious form of punishment, it is provided, in section three of article III, concerning the judiciary, that, while Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.

This, however, while it was the chief, was not the only, peculiarity of bills of attainder which was intended to be included within the constitutional restriction. Upon an attentive **[p388]** examination of the distinctive features of this kind of legislation, I think it will be found that the following comprise those essential elements of bills of attainder, in addition to the one already mentioned, which distinguish them from other legislation, and which made them so obnoxious to the statesmen who organized our government:

1. They were convictions and sentences pronounced by the legislative department of the government, instead of the judicial.

2. The sentence pronounced and the punishment inflicted were determined by no previous law or fixed rule.

3. The investigation into the guilt of the accused, if any such were made, was not necessarily or generally conducted in his presence or that of his counsel, and no recognized rule of evidence governed the inquiry. **[n1]**

It is no cause for wonder that men who had just passed successfully through a desperate struggle in behalf of civil liberty should feel a detestation for legislation of which these were the prominent features. The framers of our political system had a full appreciation of the necessity of keeping separate and distinct the primary departments of the government.

Mr. Hamilton, in the seventy-eighth number of the Federalist, says that he agrees with the maxim of Montesquieu that "there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers." And others of the ablest numbers of that publication are devoted to the purpose of showing that. in our Constitution. these powers are so justly balanced and restrained that neither will probably be able to make much encroachment upon the others. Nor was it less repugnant to their views of the security of personal rights that any person should be condemned without a hearing and punished without a law previously prescribing the nature and extent of that punishment. They therefore struck boldly at all this machinery of legislative despotism by forbidding the passage of bills of attainder and *ex post facto* laws, both to Congress and to the States. **[p389]**

It remains to inquire whether, in the act of Congress under consideration (and the remarks apply with equal force to the Missouri constitution), there is found

any one of these features of bills of attainder, and, if so, whether there is sufficient in the act to bring it fairly within the description of that class of bills.

It is not claimed that the law works a corruption of blood. It will, therefore, be conceded at once that the act does not contain this leading feature of bills of attainder.

Nor am I capable of seeing that it contains a conviction or sentence of any designated person or persons. It is said that it is not necessary to a bill of attainder that the party to be affected should be named in the act, and the attainder of the Earl of Kildare and his associates is referred to as showing that the act was aimed at a class. It is very true that bills of attainder have been passed against persons by some description when their names were unknown. But, in such cases, the law leaves nothing to be done to render its operation effectual but to identify those persons. Their guilt, its nature, and its punishment are fixed by the statute, and only their personal identity remains to be made out. Such was the case alluded to. The act declared the guilt and punishment of the Earl of Kildare, and all who were associated with him in his enterprise, and all that was required to insure their punishment was to prove that association.

If this were not so, then the act was mere *brutum fulmen,* and the parties other than the earl could only be punished, notwithstanding the act, by proof of their guilt before some competent tribunal.

No person is pointed out in the act of Congress, either by name or by description, against whom it is to operate. The oath is only required of those who propose to accept an office or to practise law, and, as a prerequisite to the exercise of the functions of the lawyer or the officer, it is demanded of all persons alike. It is said to be directed, as a class, to those alone who were engaged in the Rebellion, but this is manifestly incorrect, as the oath is exacted alike from the **[p390]** loyal and disloyal under the same circumstances, and none are compelled to take it. Neither does the act declare any conviction either of persons or classes. If so, who are they, and of what crime are they declared to be guilty? Nor does it pronounce any sentence or inflict any punishment. If by any possibility it can be said to *provide* for conviction and sentence, though not found in the act itself, it leaves the party himself to determine his own guilt or innocence and pronounce his own sentence. It is not, then, the act of Congress, but the party interested, that tries and condemns. We shall see, when we come to the discussion of this act in its relation to *ex post facto* laws, that it inflicts no punishment.

A statute, then, which designates no criminal, either by name or description -- which declares no guilt, pronounces no sentence, and inflicts no punishment -- can in no sense be called a bill of attainder.

2. Passing now to consider whether the statute is an *ex post facto* law, we find that the meaning of that term, as used in the Constitution, is a matter which has been frequently before this court, and it has been so well defined as to leave no room for controversy. The only doubt which can arise is as to the character of the particular case claimed to come within the definition, and not as to the definition of the phrase itself.

All the cases agree that the term is to be applied to criminal causes alone, and not to civil proceedings. In the language of Justice Story, in the case of *Watson v. Mercer,* **[n2]**

Ex post facto laws relate to penal and criminal proceedings, which impose punishment and forfeiture, and not to civil proceedings, which affect private

rights retrospectively. [n3]

The first case on the subject is that of *Calder v. Bull,* and it is the one in which the doctrine concerning *ex post facto* laws is most fully expounded. The court divides all laws **[p391]** which come within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution into four classes:

1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.

2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed.

3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed.

4th. Every law that alters the rule of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence to convict the offender.

Again, the court says, in the same opinion, that "the true distinction is between *ex post facto* laws and retrospective laws," and proceeds to show that, however unjust the latter may be, they are not prohibited by the Constitution, while the former are.

This exposition of the nature of *ex post facto* laws has never been denied, nor has any court or any commentator on the Constitution added to the classes of laws here set forth as coming within that clause of the organic law. In looking carefully at these four classes of laws, two things strike the mind as common to them all:

1st. That they contemplate the trial of some person charged with an offence.

2d. That they contemplate a punishment of the person found guilty of such offence.

Now, it seems to me impossible to show that the law in question contemplates either the trial of a person for an offence committed before its passage or the punishment of any person for such an offence. It is true that the act requiring an oath provides a penalty for falsely taking it. But this provision is prospective, as no one is supposed to take the oath until after the passage of the law. This prospective penalty is the only thing in the law which partakes of a criminal character. It is in all other respects a civil proceeding. **[p392]** It is simply an oath of office, and it is required of all officeholders alike. As far as I am informed, this is the first time in the history of jurisprudence that taking an oath of office has been called a criminal proceeding. If it is not a criminal proceeding, then, by all the authorities, it is not an *ex post facto* law.

No trial of any person is contemplated by the act for any past offence. Nor is any party supposed to be charged with any offence in the only proceeding which the law provides.

A person proposing to appear in the court as an attorney is asked to take a certain oath. There is no charge made against him that he has been guilty of any of the crimes mentioned in that oath. There is no prosecution. There is not even an implication of guilt by reason of tendering him the oath, for it is required of the man who has lost everything in defence of the government, and whose loyalty is written in the honorable scars which cover his body, the same as of the guiltiest traitor in the land. His refusal to take the oath subjects him to no prosecution. His taking it clears him of no guilt, and acquits him of no charge.

Where, then, is this *ex post facto* law which tries and punishes a man for a crime committed before it was passed? It can only be found in those elastic rules of construction which cramp the powers of the Federal government when they are to be exercised in certain directions, and enlarges them when they are to be exercised in others. No more striking example of this could be given than the cases before us, in one of which the Constitution of the United States is held to confer no power on Congress to prevent traitors practising in her courts, while in the other it is held to confer power on this court to nullify a provision of the constitution of the State of Missouri relating to a qualification required of ministers of religion.

But the fatal vice in the reasoning of the majority is in the meaning which they attach to the word punishment in its application to this law and in its relation to the definitions which have been given of the phrase *ex post facto* laws.

Webster's second definition of the word "punish" is this: **[p393]** "In a loose sense, to afflict with punishment, &c., with a view to amendment, to chasten." And it is in this loose sense that the word is used by this court as synonymous with chastisement, correction, loss, or suffering to the party supposed to be punished, and not in the legal sense, which signifies a penalty inflicted for the commission of crime.

And so, in this sense, it is said that, whereas persons who had been guilty of the offences mentioned in the oath were, by the laws then in force, only liable to be punished with death and confiscation of all their property, they are, by a law passed since these offences were committed, made liable to the enormous additional punishment of being deprived of the right to practise law!

The law in question does not in reality deprive a person guilty of the acts therein described of any right which he possessed before, for it is equally sound law as it is the dictate of good sense that a person who, in the language of the act, has voluntarily borne arms against the government of the United States while a citizen thereof, or who has voluntarily given aid, comfort, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility to the government, has, by doing those things, forfeited his right to appear in her courts and take part in the administration of her laws. Such a person has exhibited a trait of character which, without the aid of the law in question, authorizes the court to declare him unfit to practise before it, and to strike his name from the roll of its attorneys if it be found there.

I have already shown that this act provides for no indictment or other charge, that it contemplates and admits of no trial, and I now proceed to show that, even if the right of the court to prevent an attorney guilty of the acts mentioned from appearing in its forum depended upon the statute, that still it inflicts no punishment in the legal sense of that term.

"Punishment," says Mr. Wharton in his Law Lexicon, "is the penalty for transgressing the laws," and this is perhaps as comprehensive and at the same time as accurate a definition as can be given. Now what law is it whose transgression **[p394]** is punished in the case before us? None is referred to in the act, and there is nothing on its face to show that it was intended as an additional punishment for any offence described in any other act. A part of the matters of which the applicant is required to purge himself on oath may amount to treason, but surely there could be no intention or desire to inflict this small additional punishment for a crime whose penalty already was death and confiscation of property.

In fact, the word "punishment" is used by the court in a sense which would make a great number of laws, partaking in no sense of a criminal character, laws for punishment, and therefore *ex post facto.*

A law, for instance, which increased the facility for detecting frauds by compelling a party to a civil proceeding to disclose his transactions under oath would result in his punishment in this sense if it compelled him to pay an honest debt which could not be coerced from him before. But this law comes clearly within the class described by this court in *Watson v. Mercer* as civil proceedings which affect private rights retrospectively.

Again, let us suppose that several persons afflicted with a form of insanity heretofore deemed harmless shall be found all at once to be dangerous to the lives of persons with whom they associate. The State, therefore, passes a law that all persons so affected shall be kept in close confinement until their recovery is assured. Here is a case of punishment in the sense used by the court for a matter existing before the passage of the law. Is it an *ex post facto* law? And, if not, in what does it differ from one? Just in the same manner that the act of Congress does, namely, that the proceeding is civil, and not criminal, and that the imprisonment in the one case, and the prohibition to practise law in the other, are not punishments in the legal meaning of that term.

The civil law maxim, "*Nemo debet bis vexari, pro un a et eadam causa,*" has been long since adopted into the common law as applicable both to civil and criminal proceedings, and one of the amendments of the Constitution incorporates this **[p395]** principle into that instrument so far as punishment affects life or limb. It results from this rule that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence. We have already seen that the acts of which the party is required to purge himself on oath constitute the crime of treason. Now if the judgment of the court in the cases before us, instead of permitting the parties to appear without taking the oath, had been the other way, here would have been the case of a person who, on the reasoning of the majority, is punished by the judgment of this court for the same acts which constitute the crime of treason.

Yet if the applicant here should afterwards be indicted for treason on account of these same acts, no one will pretend that the proceedings here could be successfully pleaded in bar of that indictment. But why not? Simply because there is here neither trial nor punishment within the legal meaning of these terms.

I maintain that the purpose of the act of Congress was to require loyalty as a qualification of all who practise law in the national courts. The majority say that the purpose was to impose a punishment for past acts of disloyalty.

In pressing this argument, it is contended by the majority that no requirement can be justly said to be a qualification which is not attainable by all, and that to demand a qualification not attainable by all is a punishment.

The Constitution of the United States provides as a qualification for the offices of President and Vice-President that the person elected must be a native-born citizen. Is this a punishment to all those naturalized citizens who can never attain that qualification? The constitutions of nearly all the States require as a qualification for voting that the voter shall be a white male citizen. Is this a punishment for all the blacks who can never become white?

Again, it was a qualification required by some of the State constitutions for the office of judge that the person should not be over sixty years of age. To a very

large number of the ablest lawyers in any State, this is a qualification to which they can never attain, for every year removes **[p396]** them farther away from the designated age. Is it a punishment?

The distinguished commentator on American law, and chancellor of the State of New York, was deprived of that office by this provision of the constitution of that State, and he was thus, in the midst of his usefulness, not only turned out of office, but he was forever disqualified from holding it again, by a law passed after he had accepted the office.

This is a much stronger case than that of a disloyal attorney forbid by law to practise in the courts, yet no one ever thought the law was *ex post facto* in the sense of the Constitution of the United States.

Illustrations of this kind could be multiplied indefinitely, but they are unnecessary.

The history of the time when this statute was passed -- the darkest hour of our great struggle -- the necessity for its existence, the humane character of the President who signed the bill, and the face of the law itself, all show that it was purely a qualification, exacted in self-defence, of all who took part in administering the government in any of its departments, and that it was not passed for the purpose of inflicting punishment, however merited, for past offences.

I think I have now shown that the statute in question is within the legislative power of Congress in its control over the courts and their officers, and that it was not void as being either a bill of attainder or an *ex post facto* law.

If I am right on the questions of qualification and punishment, that discussion disposes also of the proposition that the pardon of the President relieves the party accepting it of the necessity of taking the oath, even if the law be valid.

I am willing to concede that the presidential pardon relieves the party from all the penalties, or, in other words, from all the punishment, which the law inflicted for his offence. But it relieves him from nothing more. If the oath required as a condition to practising law is not a punishment, as I think I have shown it is not, then the pardon of the President has no effect in releasing him from the requirement to take it. If it is a qualification which Congress **[p397]** had a right to prescribe as necessary to an attorney, then the President cannot, by pardon or otherwise, dispense with the law requiring such qualification.

This is not only the plain rule as between the legislative and executive departments of the government, but it is the declaration of common sense. The man who, by counterfeiting, by theft, by murder, or by treason is rendered unfit to exercise the functions of an attorney or counselor at law, may be saved by the executive pardon from the penitentiary or the gallows, but is not thereby restored to the qualifications which are essential to admission to the bar. No doubt it will be found that very many persons among those who cannot take this oath deserve to be relieved from the prohibition of the law, but this in no wise depends upon the act of the President in giving or refusing a pardon. It remains to the legislative power alone to prescribe under what circumstances this relief shall be extended.

In regard to the case of *Cummings v. The State of Missouri,* allusions have been made in the course of argument to the sanctity of the ministerial office and to the inviolability of religious freedom in this country.

But no attempt has been made to show that the Constitution of the United

States interposes any such protection between the State governments and their own citizens. Nor can anything of this kind be shown. The Federal Constitution contains but two provisions on this subject. One of these forbids Congress to make any law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The other is that no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.

No restraint is placed by that instrument on the action of the States, but on the contrary, in the language of Story, [n4]

the whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the State governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice and the State constitutions. **[p398]**

If there ever was a case calling upon this court to exercise all the power on this subject which properly belongs to it, it was the case of the Rev. B. Permoli. [n5]

An ordinance of the first municipality of the city of New Orleans imposed a penalty on any priest who should officiate at any funeral in any other church than the obituary chapel. Mr. Permoli, a Catholic priest, performed the funeral services of his church over the body of one of his parishioners inclosed in a coffin in the Roman Catholic Church of St. Augustine. For this, he was fined, and, relying upon the vague idea advanced here that the Federal Constitution protected him in the exercise of his holy functions, he brought the case to this court.

But hard as that case was, the court replied to him in the following language:

The Constitution (of the United States) makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective States in their religious liberties; this is left to the State constitutions and laws; nor is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on the States.

Mr. Permoli's writ of error was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

In that case, an ordinance of a mere local corporation forbid a priest, loyal to his government, from performing what he believed to be the necessary rites of his church over the body of his departed friend. This court said it could give him no relief.

In this case, the constitution of the State of Missouri, the fundamental law of the people of that State, adopted by their popular vote, declares that no priest of any church shall exercise his ministerial functions unless he will show by his own oath that he has borne a true allegiance to his government. This court now holds this constitutional provision void on the ground that the Federal Constitution forbids it. I leave the two cases to speak for themselves.

In the discussion of these cases, I have said nothing, on the one hand, of the great evils inflicted on the country by **[p399]** the voluntary action of many of those persons affected by the laws under consideration, nor, on the other hand, of the hardships which they are now suffering much more as a consequence of that action than of any laws which Congress can possibly frame. But I have endeavored to bring to the examination of the grave questions of constitutional law involved in this inquiry those principles alone which are calculated to assist in determining what the law is, rather than what, in my private judgment, it ought to be.

1. *See* Story on the Constitution § 1344.

2. *Calder v. Bull,* 3 Dallas 386; *Fletcher v. Peck,* 6 Cranch 87; *Ogden v. Saunders,* 12 Wheaton 266; *Satterlee v. Matthewson,* 2 Peters 380.

3. 8 Peters 88.

4. Commentaries on the Constitution § 1878.

5. 3 Howard 589.